


































































































Recent research reveals that a number of important differences of financial systems
among countries are shaped by the extent of legal protection of outside investors from
expropriation by the controlling shareholders or managers.  The findings show that better legal
protection of outside shareholders is associated with:
(1) more valuable stock markets (La Porta et al. 1997);
(2) a larger number of listed firms (La Porta et al. 1997);
(3) larger listed firms in terms of their sales or assets (Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales 1999);
(4) higher valuation of listed firms relative to their assets (Claessens et al. 1999, La Porta et al.
1999);
(5) greater dividend payouts (La Porta et al. 2000);
(6) lower concentration of ownership and control (European Corporate Governance Network
1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999, Claessens et al. 2000);
(7) lower private benefits of control (Zingales, 1994, Nenova 1999); and
(8) higher correlation between investment opportunities and actual investments (Wurgler 2000).
While the understanding of the empirical differences in the patterns of corporate finance
has advanced considerably, the theoretical work in this area is only beginning.  A number of
studies model explicitly the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling
shareholders (see, among others, Grossman and Hart 1988, Harris and Raviv 1988, Hart 1995,
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 1997, 1998, Friedman and Johnson 2000) and the legal framework
underlining such expropriation (La Porta et al. 1998, Johnson, et al. 2000).  Other studies attempt
to explain theoretically why control is so concentrated in countries with poor shareholder
protection (Zingales 1995, La Porta et al. 1999, Bebchuk 1999), and why such organizational2
form as pyramids may be common (Wolfenzon 1999).  Still other studies, such as Bennedsen
and Wolfenzon (2000), argue that control structures with multiple large shareholders may be
efficient in the environments with poor shareholder protection.  La Porta et al. (1999) make the
case for higher concentration of cash flow ownership (and not just control) in countries with poor
shareholder protection.  Each of these studies has focused on specific aspects of legal
environments with weak shareholder protection.  A market equilibrium model of corporate
finance in such environments remains to be developed.
2
In this paper we present one such model.  The model incorporates elements of
Becker’s (1968) classic “crime and punishment” framework into a corporate finance
environment of Jensen and Meckling (1976).  We consider an entrepreneur trying to raise equity
finance for a project, and deciding how much equity to sell and how big a project to undertake.
We follow the literature (Zingales 1995, Bebchuk 1999) in maintaining that the entrepreneur
keeps control of the project after the initial share offering.   This entrepreneur operates in an
environment with limited legal protection of outside shareholders, and so has an opportunity to
divert some of the profits of the firm once they materialize (Burkart, Gromb, Panunzi 1998).  By
doing so, he risks being sued and fined for breaking the law or the shareholder agreement.  The
quality of investor protection in our model is given by the likelihood that the entrepreneur is
caught and fined for expropriating shareholders.
In this simple model, we show how the entrepreneur’s decisions on the size of the project
and the amount of cash flow to sell are shaped by the legal environment.  We then embed this
                                                
2 One strand of the empirical literature not discussed in this paper deals with the implications of
investor protection for economic growth.  On this, see Carlin and Mayer (1999), Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998).3
going public decision into a market equilibrium with savers and firms, and consider the
determination of the size of the capital market.  We consider both the case of the world-wide
capital market, and that of segmented national markets.
Under plausible conditions, this model generates a number of predictions.  Firms are
larger, more valuable and more plentiful, dividends are higher (and shareholder expropriation
lower), ownership concentration is lower, and stock markets are more developed in countries
with better protection of shareholders.  In fact, the simple model delivers results corresponding to
all eight findings summarized above.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 describes the demand and supply of funds.
The equilibrium is described in Section 4.  Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.  The model
Consider a world with C countries, each one populated by J entrepreneurs.  Each
entrepreneur, E
j,c (entrepreneur j from country c), can develop a project by setting up a firm.
Entrepreneurs differ in their initial wealth, W
jc
1
, , and in the productivity of their projects, g
jc , .
Since the focus of the paper is on the effect of investor protection, we assume that all countries
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The model has two dates.  At date 1, entrepreneurs choose whether to set up a firm.
Firms have two sources of finance.  First, from his date 1 wealth, each entrepreneur, E
j,c,
contributes RW E
jc jc ,, ≤ 1  to the firm.  He invests his remaining wealth in the market.  Second, E
j,c
raises  RM
jc ,  from the market by selling a fraction  x
jc ,  of the firm's cash flow rights.  We assume
that entrepreneurs retain control of their firms regardless of the fraction of the cash flow rights4





jc ,,, ≤+  in the project, and
the remaining  RRI E
jc
M
jc jc ,, , +−  in the market.
The market interest rate for country c, i
c, is determined by the supply and demand for
funds.  Each country’s demand for funds is the sum of the individual firm’s demand (i.e., for




∈ ∑ ).  Similarly, each country’s supply of funds is the
sum of entrepreneurs’ supply of funds plus the individual firm’s supply of funds (i.e., for country
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∈∈ ∑∑ ).  We consider two cases.  In
the first, there is perfect capital mobility and the  world’s supply and demand schedules
determine the common interest rate.  In the second, there is no capital mobility and each
country’s interest rate is determined by its own demand and supply schedules.
Revenue is realized at date 2.  The production function exhibits constant returns to scale:
every dollar invested in the project generates 
j g + 1  dollars.  The date 2 revenue of the firm,
Π
jc , , is then given by:
Π
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The entrepreneur chooses the fraction d
jc ,  of the revenue he diverts.  We assume that the
levels of legal protection afforded to minority shareholders vary across countries.  Following
Becker (1968),  we assume that the entrepreneur is caught with probability k
c∈ [0,1], where the
parameter k
c is a measure of legal protection of investors in country c.  Higher values of k
c
correspond to better investor protection.
If the entrepreneur is caught, he is forced to return the diverted amount to the firm and, in
addition, pay a fine of  fd
jc j ()
, Π  to the authorities.  In this case, the entire revenue is distributed5
as dividends.  However, if the entrepreneur is not caught, he keeps the entire diverted amount.
The fraction of the revenue not diverted, ( )
,, 1− d
jk jk Π , is distributed as dividends.  The
entrepreneur’s payoff at date 2 is given by:
[ ] [ ]
c j c j c j c j c j c c j c j c j c j c d d x k d f x k
, , , , , , , , , ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( Π + Π − − − + Π − Π −
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Rearranging this expression yields:
( )
c j c j c c j c j c c j c j c c j d f k d k d k x
, , , , , , , ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( Π − Π − + Π − − −





c j c R W i − + + (2)
Because the entrepreneur keeps the diverted amount with probability 1− k
c, ( )
,, 1− kd
cj c j c Π  is
the expected diversion and () 11 −− ()
,, kd
cj c j c Π  is the expected dividend.  The first term in
equation (2) is the fraction of the dividends that the entrepreneur obtains from his cash flow
holding in the firm.  The second term is the expected diversion or private benefits of control
(Grossman and Hart 1988).  The third term is the expected fine and the fourth term is the amount
the entrepreneur receives from his investment in the market.
Finally, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The function  ) (⋅ f  satisfies:
a) 0 ) 0 ( = f ,
b)  0 ) 0 ( ' = f ,
c)  0 ) ( ' ' > d f , and
d)  0














No fine is incurred when diversion is zero (assumption 1a), and the fine is essentially
zero for the first cent diverted (assumption 1b).  Assumption 1c) implies that the marginal
increase in the fine is increasing with the amount diverted.  Assumption 1d) sets a bound on the
speed at which  ) ( ' ' d f  increases.  That is, we allow ) ( ' ' d f to be decreasing, constant or even
increasing, as long as it does not increase too fast.  As we discuss below, even though
assumption 1d) seems special, it actually prevents the results from being driven too much by the
shape of  () f .
3  In particular, this assumption eliminates the “boil them in oil” results, in which
expropriation is precluded entirely with sufficiently heavy penalties even when the probability of
detection is low.  Extremely heavy civil penalties are uncommon in most countries for reasons of
fairness, wealth constraints, and the possibility of false convictions.
3.  The demand and supply of funds
In this section we take the interest rate i
c as given and analyze the choices of an
entrepreneur, E
j,c.  To lighten notation, we suppress the superscripts in all variables.
At date 2, E chooses the level of diversion to maximize his payoff:
() {} ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( max 1 E d R W i d kf d k d k x − + + Π − − + − − −
The optimal diversion level  ) , (
* k x d  satisfies the following first order condition
4:
x k d kf ) 1 ( ) ( '
* − = (3)
                                                
3 The results of the model are essentially the same if the fine  ) , ( k d f depends on both the amount
diverted and the level of investor protection.  In this case we need to add the assumption
0 ) , ( 12 > k d f , that is, that the marginal fine is larger in countries with better investor protection.
Assumptions 1a-1c will remain the same (i.e.,  0 ) , 0 ( = k f , 0 ) , 0 ( 1 = k f , and  0 ) , ( 11 > k d f ) and































From the viewpoint of the entrepreneur, the left-hand side of equation (3) is the marginal cost of
diverting, or the marginal increase in the expected fine.  For the next dollar diverted, the fine
increases by f’(d)and he pays this fine with probability k.  The right-hand side is the marginal
benefit of diverting, or the marginal increase in expected dividend savings.  By diverting an extra
dollar, the entrepreneur avoids paying a fraction x of it to outside shareholders, however, he
keeps this dollar only with probability 1-k.
Proposition 1: Suppose that assumptions 1a)-c) hold. The solution to equation (3),  ) , (
* k x d ,
satisfies:
a) 0 ) , 0 (
* = k d ,
b) 0 ) , (
*
1 > k x d , and
c) 0 ) , (
*
2 < k x d .
The subscripts 1 and 2 denote the derivatives with respect to the first and second argument
respectively.  Part a) follows because, for  0 = x , E gets the entire dividend and, therefore, he has
no reason to divert and possibly pay a fine.
Part b) follows because the higher the fraction of the cash flow rights in the hands of
outside shareholders, the higher the fraction of the next dollar diverted that E avoids paying to
them.  That is, the marginal benefit of diverting is higher.  Part b) is the well-known Jensen and
Meckling’s (1976) result that higher ownership concentration leads to more efficient actions.
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998) and La Porta et al. (1999) derive similar results.
                                                                                                                                                            
4 Assumption 1c guarantees that the second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied.8
Finally, part c) follows because better investor protection (higher k ) implies that
diversion is more costly (the entrepreneur pays the fine more often) and less beneficial (the
entrepreneur keeps the diverted amount less often).  Expected diversion, ( )
* 1− kdΠ , is also
lower in better investor protection environments.  This is because diversion itself is lower (part c)
and, in addition, the entrepreneur is forced to return the diverted amount to the firm more often.
Below, we show that the firm invests in the project the entire amount committed to it.
This implies that, in this model, Tobin's Q is given by  ) 1 ))( 1 ( 1 (
* g k d + − − .  In addition,
expected dividends divided by investment are given by  ) 1 ))( 1 ( 1 (
* g k d + − − , and divided by pre-
expropriation cash flow are  )) 1 ( 1 (
* k d − − .  Similarly, expected private benefits divided by
investment are given by  ) 1 )( 1 (
* g k d + − , and divided by pre-theft cash flow are  ) 1 (
* k d − .  The
next result follows:
Corollary 1: Controlling for ownership concentration, Tobin's Q and dividends are higher and
private benefits lower in countries with better investor protection.
These results are consistent with the findings in La Porta et al. (1999) (for Tobin's Q), La
Porta et al. (2000) (for dividends) and Nenova (1999) (for private benefits)--findings (4), (5), and
(7) of the introduction.
The sensitivity of diversion to ownership concentration, 
*
1 d , plays an important role in
the analysis.  Equation (3) shows that the change of this quantity as ownership concentration
varies is determined by  ) ( ' ' d f .  Assumption 1d) guarantees that  ) ( ' ' d f  does not increase too
fast, and hence 
*
1 d  is relatively constant throughout the ownership range. In addition, as the next9
proposition indicates, this sensitivity is lower in countries with better investor protection.
Proposition 2:  Suppose assumptions 1a)-1d) hold, then  0 ) , (
*
12 < k x d .
By Proposition 1, for two different levels of investor protection  L H k k > , diversion is
zero at  0 = x , and is lower for  H k  at all  0 > x .  This is shown in the following figure:
Proposition 2 states that, at any  x, in addition to being below curve  L k , curve  H k  has a
lower slope.  Unlike Proposition 1, the proof of Proposition 2 requires assumption 1d.  However,
even without assumption 1d, Proposition 2 must usually hold; otherwise, it would be impossible
for curve  H k  to be always below curve  L k .  In other words, even though we cannot derive
Proposition 2 from Assumptions 1a-1c, we can guarantee with these three assumptions that “on
average” the slope of curve  H k  is smaller than that of curve  L k .
5  In addition, we could do the
rest of the analysis with the weaker condition that the sensitivity of expected diversion to
ownership concentration, 
*
1 ) 1 ( d k − , is decreasing in investor protection.
There is some empirical support for Proposition 2.   La Porta et al. (1999) find that,





in poor investor protection countries.  This translates into our model as
()
0








g k x d k
k
.  Since  0
*
1 > d , this inequality holds if and only if





k x d k
k
.  This last inequality is sufficient for the proofs of the remaining results.
A natural question to ask at this point is whether, for a given x, an increase in investor
protection reduces the expected fine entrepreneurs pay.  At first, the answer is ambiguous since
such an increase has two opposing effects on the expected fine.  On the one hand, the expected
fine increases since the entrepreneur is more likely to be caught (direct effect).  On the other
hand, however, the entrepreneur diverts less (incentive effect), and consequently, when he is
caught, the fine is smaller.  The following proposition establishes that the incentive effect
dominates the direct effect.




k x d kf
k
.
Proposition 3 states that in the equilibrium where diversion is determined endogenously,
the expected fine is larger in countries with poorer investor protection.  To understand this result,
compare the increase in the expected fine (not the total expected fine) as more shares are sold,




.  This increase is given by the change in expected fine due to an increase in
diversion times the change in the level of diversion 
*
1
*) ( ' d d kf ⋅ .  In choosing the optimal
                                                                                                                                                            








1 ) , ( ( ) , (.11
diversion level at date 2, the entrepreneur equates the increase in the expected fine,  ) ( ' d kf , and
the increase in expected dividend savings, (1-k)x.  In a country with poorer investor protection,
both the increase in expected dividend savings is higher (the entrepreneur is less likely to be
caught) and also the increase in diversion is higher (by Proposition 2).  For a given increase in
the fraction of shares sold, then, the expected fine increases by more in the country with poorer
investor protection.  Since this is true at all levels of ownership concentration, the total expected
fine is higher as well.
At date 1, E chooses the size of the project, I , the amount of funds he contributes to the
firm,  E R , and the fraction of the firm’s cash flows he sells,  x, by solving the following
maximization problem:
( ) {} ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( max 1
* * *
, , E x R I R W i d kf d k d k x
E − + + Π − − + − − −
such that  (4)
1 W RE ≤ , and
M E R R I + ≤ ,
Letting )) , ( ) 1 ( 1 ( ) , (
* k x d k x k x r − − =  be the fraction of the total revenue that outside









If the solution to the above problem is not to invest in the project ( 0
* = I ) and not to
raise funds ( 0
* = M R ), we say that the firm is not set up.
Proposition 4:  At the solution the following holds:
a)  If  i g < , the firm is not set up.12
b)  If  i g =  the entrepreneur is indifferent between not setting up the firm, and setting up the firm
with no outside shareholders ( 0
* = x ) and investing any fraction of his wealth in the project.
c)  If  i g > , the firm is set up and the solution can be of two types:
1) If  1
1
1
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2) If  1
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k x r x , the entrepreneur invests all his wealth in the project and sets
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When  i g < , the entrepreneur does not invest in the project since the market yields a
higher rate of return.  In addition, he does not raise funds from the market.  At first, it seems that
raising funds from the market, reinvesting them in the market and then diverting a fraction of
them is a beneficial action for the entrepreneur.  However, with rational investors, an
entrepreneur who raises funds pays for these funds in full and also incurs an additional cost due
to the expected fine he pays.  It is only beneficial to raise funds when they can be invested at a
higher rate than they are raised.
When  i g = , the entrepreneur is indifferent between investing in the project or in the
market and, as explained above, it is not beneficial for him to raise funds.13
When  i g > , the entrepreneur invests all his wealth in the project since it yields a higher
return than the market.  In addition, in this case, it pays to raise some funds from the market to
invest them at this higher rate.  However, for the reason explained above, the funds raised are
always invested in the project and never reinvested in the market (
* * * I R R M E = + ).








) , ( .  In case c1) there is an x
for which this expression is larger than 1.  The entrepreneur sets x to such a value and raises
more than one dollar per dollar invested.  This allows him to invest any amount he wants.  To
maximize his wealth, he sets  +∞ = I  and demands an infinite amount of funds.  Obviously, the
equilibrium never lies in this region.  The interest rate rises to equate demand and supply.








) , (  is less than 1 (case c2), the entrepreneur has to
contribute a fraction of each dollar invested and the size of the project is limited by his personal
wealth.  Using the fact that 
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 is the NPV per dollar invested.  Since investors demand the market
interest rate i, the entrepreneur receives the entire NPV that the project generates.  In addition,









*  is the present value of the
expected fine per dollar invested.  The entrepreneur faces the following trade-off when choosing
x.  A higher  x leads to higher diversion and, therefore, a higher fine, but also allows E to raise
more funds and expand the size of the project.  At the solution (equation (5)), the marginal cost14
(left-hand side) and the marginal benefit (right-hand side) of increasing x are the same.
Finally, the reason why the solution to equation (5) is a maximum (as opposed to a
minimum) is closely related to Assumption 1d.  Although the technical proof is in the appendix,
we explain here why the marginal cost is increasing and the marginal benefit decreasing, a
sufficient condition for the solution of (5) to be a maximum. The marginal cost is the increase in
expected fine as a result of an increase in the cash flows sold, x.  As explained after Proposition
3, this increase is given by the change in the expected fine due to an change in diversion times
the increase in diversion, 
*
1
*) ( ' d d kf ⋅ .  Recall that, at date 2, the entrepreneur equates the
increase in the expected fine due to a change in diversion,  ) ( '
* d kf , with the increase in expected
dividend savings (1-k)x, which is increasing in x.  Therefore, as long as the increase in diversion,
*
1 d , is relatively constant throughout the ownership range, the marginal cost is increasing in x.
But, this is precisely what assumption 1d ensures.
The marginal benefit of increasing x is given by the higher than the market rate at which
the additional revenue raised can be invested.  Here we explain why the additional revenue raised




1 d k x d k k x r − − + − − = .
The first bracket is the quantity effect.  This is the price the market pays for the additional unit
sold.  Note that for high values of x, the market expects higher diversion and hence pays a lower
price for the additional unit sold.  That is, the quantity effect is decreasing in x.  The second
bracket is the price effect.  As a result of the additional cash flows the firm sells, the price
decreases.  The price effect is the negative effect on revenue that this price decline has on all the
units sold.  Thus the magnitude of the price effect is given by the number of units sold (i.e., x)
and by the decline in the price or, equivalently, by the increase in diversion.  If the increase in
diversion is relatively constant, then the higher the x, the higher the price effect.  But this is15
precisely what Assumption 1d ensures.  In sum, as x is increases, the positive quantity effect
decreases and the negative price effect increases.  Therefore, the additional revenue is decreasing
in x.  This discussion illustrates that the role of Assumption 1d is to prevent the results from
being driven solely by the shape of the f() function.
The demand and supply of funds are derived directly from Proposition 4.  Firm demand is
downward sloping in the interest rate i.  For a sufficiently large  ) ( g i > , the firm is not set up and
therefore demand is zero.  For intermediate value of i, the firm is set up and its demand for











1 .  Over a range, as i decreases, demand increases.
Finally, for i sufficiently low, the demand for funds is infinite. Since individual firm’s demand
is downward sloping, so is aggregate demand.
The supply of funds from an entrepreneur is as follows.  If the interest rate is higher than
the productivity of his project (i>g), the entrepreneur does not set up a firm and supplies his
entire wealth to the market.  If, however, the interest rate is below his project’s productivity
(i<g), the entrepreneur invests his entire wealth in the project and does not supply funds to the
market.  In the case where i=g, the entrepreneur is indifferent between supplying any fraction of
his wealth to the market and investing the rest in a wholly-owned firm.  Note that investor
protection does not affect the supply of funds.  Finally, aggregate supply of funds is upward
sloping.  As the interest rate rises, more entrepreneurs find it profitable to supply their wealth to
the market rather than setting up their own firms.
4.  Equilibrium
We consider two cases.  In Section 4.1, we assume perfect capital mobility across
countries, and in Section 4.2 we assume no capital mobility.16
4.1. Perfect capital mobility
In this case, world interest rate 
* i  equates world demand and supply for funds:













It can be shown that an equilibrium interest rate exists.  At 
* i , no entrepreneur will be in
case (c1) of Proposition 4 because, in that case, the demand for funds is infinite.
Proposition 5:  Consider two countries (H and L) that differ in the level of investor protection,
with  
L H k k > . Country H will have:
a) Lower ownership concentration (for all j, 
L j H j x x
, , * * > ),







, , * * ), and
c) Higher investment level, i.e., larger firms (for all j, 
L j H j I I
, , * * > ).
These results correspond to findings (6), (1) and (3) from the introduction.  Part a) of this
proposition follows from the first order condition in equation (5), which we re-write here as:
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This expression equates the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of selling an
additional fraction of the cash flow rights (increasing  x).  The marginal cost (left-hand side)
derives from the increase in the expected fine.  The fine increases since diversion is higher for17
lower ownership concentration levels.  The marginal benefit (right-hand side) derives from the
higher than market return at which the additional funds raised can be invested.
Suppose, for the sake of explanation, that the fraction on the right-hand side is a constant
θ .  This variable can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of funds. Recall that, with better
investor protection, any increase in  x translates into a smaller increase in 
* d , that is, diversion is
less sensitive to ownership concentration.  First, marginal cost decreases with an increase in
investor protection. The reason is that a smaller increase in diversion translates into a smaller
increase in the fine.
Second, with better investor protection, more funds are raised when x is increased, that is,
the marginal benefit is higher.  An increase in x has two effects on the amount raised: it increases
the fraction of cash flow rights sold (quantity effect), but it reduces share prices (price effect) due
to the increase in diversion. In better investor protection countries, the effect of x on diversion is
lower, and hence the price reaction is smaller.  Thus, more funds are raised.
Summing up, holding  the opportunity cost of funds constant, 
* x increases with investor
protection because the marginal cost schedule shifts down and the marginal benefit schedule
shifts up.
Finally, we consider the effect of investor protection on the opportunity cost of funds, θ .
By Proposition 3, for a given x, the expected fine is smaller in better investor protection
countries. Also, the amount of funds raised is larger. These two facts imply that the opportunity
cost of funds is higher in better investor protection countries. This result only strengthens the
result that 
* x  is higher in better investor protection countries, since the marginal benefit
increases not only because E raises more funds but also because those funds yield a higher
return.  This result is consistent with previous empirical literature, such as La Porta, Lopez-de-18
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000).
Part b) is not as straightforward as it first appears. It is true that, in better investor
protection countries, firms sell more shares. But the size of the capital market is measured in
dollars. Since lower concentration leads to lower prices, it is not a priori clear that better investor
protection countries have larger capital markets. The intuition for the result is as follows. As
explained above, an increase in  x has two opposite effects on the amount raised: the quantity
and the price effect.  At the solution, it must be the case that the quantity effect dominates the
price effect, that is, the solution is in a region where the amount raised increases with  x.  If this
were not the case, E could increase his payoff by reducing  x because by doing so, he would
reduce the fine and also increase the amount raised. Higher equilibrium  x's therefore do imply
larger capital markets.  This result is consistent with La Porta et al. (1997).
Part c) follows directly from the previous result. E invests the sum of his own funds plus
the amount he raises. The more he raises, the more he invests.  This result is consistent with the
findings of Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999).
We now analyze the number of firms going public. In this model, an entrepreneur goes
public (i.e., in this model, sells shares) as long as the return on assets, g, is larger than the interest
rate, i. The reason is that no matter how bad minority shareholders are protected, the costs due to
diversion are initially very small and it always pays to sell at least a small fraction of the firm’s
cash flows. However, the situation changes if there is a small cost of going public, c, that the
firm incurs. This cost can be interpreted as the listing costs, such as investment banking fees.
Proposition 6: More firms go public in better investor protection countries.19
Because the benefit of going public is larger in better investor protection countries, there
are more projects there for which it is profitable to pay the cost to go public.  This result is
consistent with the evidence in La Porta et al. (1997)--finding (2) in the introduction.
This result reinforces those of Proposition 5.  As a consequence of the direct cost of
going public, some firms in poor investor protection countries that would have gone public
absent this cost, stay private.  They remain wholly owned by the entrepreneur and do not raise
funds.  The variation among countries in ownership concentration and the size of the capital
markets is larger than without this direct cost.
Finally, we analyze Tobin’s Q, dividends, and private benefits of control under different
levels of investor protection. In Corollary 1, we found that, controlling for ownership, Tobin’s Q
and dividends are higher and private benefits lower in countries with better investor protection.
This result was driven by the fact that, controlling for ownership, expected diversion is higher in
countries with inferior investor protection (recall that Tobin’s Q and dividends divided by
investment are both given by  ) 1 )( ) 1 ( 1 (
* g d k + − −  and private benefits by  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* g d k + − ).
Without controlling for ownership, the result is not as straightforward.  The change in expected
diversion, 
* ) 1 ( d k − , when investor protection improves is given by


















An increase in investor protection implies that the entrepreneur keeps the diverted
amount less often, thereby reducing expected diversion.  This effect is captured by the first term.
The rest of the expression represents the change in actual diversion.  Recall that an increase in
investor protection reduces ownership concentration.  The second term represents the increase in
diversion due to the decline in ownership concentration.  Finally, an increase in investor20
protection discourages diversion (Proposition 1c) and this effect is captured by the third term.
For high levels of investor protection diversion is low.  At the extreme, when  1 = k , the
entrepreneur never keeps the diverted amount since he is always caught.  In addition, he pays the
fine.  Therefore, he does not divert regardless of the ownership structure.  Thus around  1 = k
diversion is low.
However, what happens at intermediate levels of investor protection is given by the
magnitude of the three effects discussed above.  The first effect (the increase in the probability of
returning the diverting amount) is always negative and therefore a sufficient condition for the
total effect to be negative is that actual diversion be decreasing in k.  The following proposition
lays out this sufficient condition.
Proposition 7: If  0












 then  0 ) , ( ) 1 (




The condition implies that the equilibrium level of xchanges slowly with investor
protection.  When this is the case, the increase in diversion due to the decline in ownership
concentration is small compared to the decrease in diversion due to the disincentive effect of
investor protection.
When Proposition 7 holds, countries with better investor protection have higher Tobin’s
Q, higher dividends, and lower private benefits of control, even though they have lower
ownership concentration. These results correspond to findings (4), (5) and (7) of the introduction.21
4.2. No capital mobility
In this case, each country has its interest rate determined by its own supply and demand
of funds. That is, for country c, the interest rate, 
c i , is given by:













The following result can be established:
Proposition 8: Consider two countries with different levels of investor protection.  The country
with better investor protection will have a higher market interest rate.
The supply schedule of funds in these two countries is the same (see Section 3), but
demand is higher in the country with better investor protection. Consequently, the interest rate is
higher in this country.  This result yields a counterintuitive – but standard -- prediction that,
when capital markets in emerging countries open up, capital flows from them to developed
countries, which have better investor protection.  One possible reason that we observe the
opposite is that the growth prospects in the opening markets (as measured by g in the model)
improve, which leads to capital flows from developed countries.  Another possible reason is risk
sharing and diversification.
Regarding the other results in this setting, capital markets are larger and there is more
investment in better investor protection countries, but the difference is smaller than in the
previous section due to the effect of a higher interest rate. Also, ownership concentration is lower
in better investor protection countries, provided the supply of funds is not too steep. An
interesting corollary of Proposition 8 is the following:22
Corollary 2:  In countries with better investor protection, not only are more funds raised by
firms, but also these funds are channeled to higher productivity projects.
This result is consistent with the empirical results of Wurgler (2000) and corresponds to
finding (8) of the introduction.  This result holds since better investor protection leads high
productivity firms to demand more funds. This increased demand raises the country’s interest
rate.  As a result, entrepreneurs with moderately productive projects supply their funds to the
market in good investor protection countries, but set up their own projects in poor investor
protection countries.  As a consequence, in good investor protection countries funds concentrate
in the high productivity projects.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a very basic model of an entrepreneur going public in an
environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders.  We examined this
entrepreneur’s decisions and the market equilibrium.  We found that this model is consistent with
the basic empirical regularities concerning the relationship between investor protection and
corporate finance.   It does not appear to us that a simpler model can explain all the existing
findings.  It remains to be seen whether a more complicated model, particularly one that
considers the allocation of resources across sectors and internal as well as external finance, can
account for some of the additional differences of financial structures across countries.23
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Part a) follows because by Assumption 1b),  0 ) 0 ( ' = f .  Part b) follows by completely
differentiating equation (3) with respect to x to obtain  0












k x d .  Similarly,
part c) follows by completely differentiating equation (3) with respect to k to obtain
0




2 < − =
d f k
x
k x d .
Proof of Proposition 2
Note that 
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.  That
is, the sensitivity of expected diversion to ownership concentration is decreasing in investor
protection  This last (weaker) condition is sufficient to prove the following propositions.
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The second line follows from  0 ) , 0 (
* = k d  (Proposition 1a),  0 ) 0 ( = f  (Assumption 1a), and by
the replacing  )) , ( ( '
* k h d f from the FOC in equation (3). The last inequality follows from
Proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 4
We first solve for Π  and  M R  (note that, in the text, each one is defined as a function of
the other) to obtain:
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Using these expressions, the entrepreneur’s problem in equation (4) can be written as
{} ) )( 1 (
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where the last inequality is equivalent to  I R R M E ≥ + .
First, consider the case where  i g < .  Since  0 < − i g , the objective function is decreasing
in I.  Since (A3) is satisfied for  0
* = I , it is optimal to set  0
* = I .  Now, if  0
* = x , then  0
* = M R .
So suppose  0
* > x .  This implies that  0 ) (








.  Therefore setting
0
* = E R  maximizes the objective function. In addition, both (A2) and (A3) are satisfied for25
0
* = E R  and  0
* = I .  Finally, for these values,  0
* = M R .
Second, consider the case where  i g = .  If  0 = x , the objective function reduces to
1 ) 1 ( W i + , and  0 = M R .  In this case  E R  and I can be set to any value that satisfy the constraint.








 and therefore  0 = E R  maximizes the objective function.
Since I does not affect the objective function, it can be set to any value that satisfy (A3), in this
case, the only possible value is  0 = I .  Note that, in this case, the objective function also reduces
to  1 ) 1 ( W i + , and that  0 = M R .
Finally, consider the case where  i g > .  In this case, the objective function is increasing
in I.  Therefore, in sub-case 1), 









k x r  and  +∞ =
* I .  For these values,
the constraints are satisfied and the objective function is maximized.
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* * *  or equivalently 
* * I R R M E > + .  Since the constrain is not
binding, I can be increased, thereby increasing the objective function (contradiction). Since in
this sub-case the expression in brackets is positive, (A3) binds at the solution.
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At the solution, the entrepreneur sets x such that the expression in brackets in (A1’) is26
positive (this expression is positive for  0 = x , and therefore, it must be positive at the solution)
and therefore, he sets I as high as possible. That is, constraint (A2) binds, which means that the
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, the problem reduces to  ) , ( max k x G x . The
FOC of this problem,  0 ) , (
*
1 = k x G , is equation (5).  Finally, we show that the SOC for a
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parenthesis are positive by assumption 1d.
Proof of Proposition 5


























− = − =
∂
∂
.( A 4 )
We need to show that the above expression is positive. By the SOC,  0 ) , (
*
11 < k x G . As
stated above  0 > M . The first term in the numerator is positive since, by Proposition 2,
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.  The second term is the product of two positive expressions.  First,27
0 ) , 0 ( > k G , and therefore, at the optimal  0 ) , (
* > k x G .  Second,










r  because the two terms in the first bracket decrease with
k, and, by Proposition 2, the second term is negative.  Finally, the third term in the numerator is
also the product of two positive numbers. At the solution,  0 ) , (
*
1 > k x r , otherwise equation (5)
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(0 2 < d  by Proposition 1c) and the second term is negative by Proposition 3.



































This expression is increasing in  ) , (
* k x r .  And  0 ) , ( ) , (






















 by part a), 2)  0 ) , (
*
1 > k x r  and  0 ) , (
*
2 > k x r  as explained in the proof of part a).
Since this is true for every firm j, it is also true for the aggregate.
Part c). E invests in assets the amount he raises in the market plus his entire wealth.
Since he raises more for higher k , the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6
By going public, E gets  c W W k x G − + 1 1








the envelope theorem,  ) , (






= .  This expression is positive as explained in part a)
of the proof of Proposition 5.  Therefore, the difference between going public and staying private28
is increasing in k.  That is, in good investor protection countries, the g required for the gains of
going public to outweigh the cost c is lower. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Let ) (k x  be the equilibrium level of  x for any firm j when the country’s level of investor









Since  0 ' ' > f , the higher the right hand side, the higher the level of diversion.  Therefore,















Proof of Proposition 8
As explained in Section 3, the supply of funds is independent of the degree of investor
protection. In addition, as explained in part b) of the proof of Proposition 5, for a given i, demand
is higher in good investor protection countries. The result follows.29
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